For the long term this defense package would establish a dominant nuclear strike force for deterrence of Soviet aggression and defense against surprise attack. Showing the administrationвЂ™s sense of urgency, the budgets advanced the date for completion of the expansion from mid-1954 to mid-1952. The new strategy called for a huge expansion of defense and military assistance programs for the defense of Europe while continuing the Korean conflict to an acceptable cease-fire. By April 1951 they were ready to submit to Congress their budgets to implement fully the plans called for in NSC 68/4. They worked intensely under the specter of a possible global war against the communist allies. In the early months of 1951 officials in the defense department and the budget bureau developed detailed plans to meet the challenge posed by the heavy Soviet support for the massive Chinese intervention in Korea. Zhou EnlaiвЂ™s comments combined with the fact that Chinese вЂњvolunteersвЂќ were driving American and allied forces below the border and well into South Korea made an impression upon Harry Truman, who declared in his dairy for December 9: вЂњIt looks like World War III is here.вЂќ Zhou said that China has therefore made itself ready for World War III.вЂќ It stated that Zhou Enlai, Mao ZedongвЂ™s foreign minister and top adviser, had declared to the East German ambassador in Beijing that вЂњa third world war is inevitable as long as neither UN nor Chinese forces are willing to leave Korea. It concluded with the warning that вЂњthe USSR is prepared to accept, and may be seeking to precipitate, a general war between the United States and China, despite the inherent risk of global war.вЂќ An item in the CIAвЂ™s daily briefing of December 7 reinforced this warning. A detailed CIA memorandum of December 2 argued that the Soviet Union was the initiator of the Chinese intervention and the main source of its weapons and supplies. Intelligence reports soon confirmed American leaders in their decisions but heightened their fears. Marshall, the US had rejected the demands of a high-level British delegation for an immediate cease-fire and major concessions to the new Chinese communist government. Led by the president, Secretary of State Dean Acheson, and Secretary of Defense George C. The Truman administration had strengthened its commitment to these policy goals by December 8. Underlying this concept were two fundamental principles: General Douglas MacArthur, the commander of UN forces in Korea, would have to fight without any large addition of troops, and US defense resources would have to be expanded for the top priority of defending Europe. Washington and its allies would continue fighting in Korea they would avoid a general war with China and its Soviet sponsor and their basic goal would be to negotiate a cease-fire around the 38 th Parallel after improving their military position. The United States would abandon its objective of unifying Korea and holding elections under United Nations auspices. President Harry Truman ordered a broad strategic review to evaluate all possible responses.Д«y December 3 national security leaders had agreed on policy goals. Now a massive Chinese offensive had completely surprised them and driven them back toward the 38 th Parallel. Only two weeks earlier advanced patrols of American and South Korean forces had reached the Yalu River border between North Korea and Manchuria. In the early days of December 1950, fear and despair gripped senior officials of the Truman administration. Careers, Fellowships, and Internships Open/Close.Science and Technology Innovation Program.

The Middle East and North Africa Workforce Development Initiative.Kissinger Institute on China and the United States.Nuclear Proliferation International History Project.North Korea International Documentation Project.Environmental Change and Security Program.Hyundai Motor-Korea Foundation Center for Korean History and Public Policy.

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